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"The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.'' 1
This statement, originally made by Cardozo, has been widely quoted, especially by
William Prosser. Concerning products liability, Prosser noted in 1960 that the assault
was weD developed;2 in 1966 he concluded that the citadel had fallen.3

Rasmussen y South Florida Blood Service. 500 S.2d 533 (Fla. 1987).

The citadel of privity is again under assault This time it relates to liability for
defective housing. Specifically, this paper will (1.) review the backgrowtd and origin
of the implied wammty of habitability, (ll.) identify seven factors which court
decisions have weighed and utilized in defining and refining the warranty, (DI.)
analyze the heart of the implied warranty
privity issue, {N.)
compare the application of the warranty with the development of products liability,
and conclude by speculating on possible new directions for the development of the
Warranty.
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Background
4

The doctrine of caveat emptor in the housing industiy is dying. In the past
or at least
twenty-five years, nearly all jurisdictions hav:
it with either an implied warranty of habitability or some modificatJ.on of 1t
Unfortunately, neither builders nor purchasers are able to predict what the courtcreated warranty requires or offers. The piecemeal birth of the warranty has resulted
in a ghost child who assumes different shapes and names depending upon the
jurisdiction of its birth. It is not the purpose of this section to closely examine each
inconsistency, but merely to state the general rule or trend.
The first case directly touching upon the warranty of habitability issue in this
cotmtry appears to be a 1957 case from the Ohio court of appeals. 6 The plaintiffs, in
this case the homeowners (and initial-purchasers), alleged that the contractorsdefendants failed to construct the home in a workmanlike manner since sewage and
water flooded the home's basement. The cowt focused on the fact that the sale of the
house took place priQ! to the completion of the house.
This remained an important concept since the cowt went to great lengths to
note
In this opinion we will not go into a discussion of the duty of the
seller of a completed house to the buyer, with every varying
circwnstance surrollllding such sale. Nor will we discuss the legal
questions of caveat emptor and express wamm.ty, except to say only
that the vendor of a completed house, in respect of which there is no
work going on and no work to be done, does not generally, in the
absence of some express bargain or warranty, undertake any obligation
with regard to the condition of the house...7

The Ohio cowt,stating that "...we have found but few cases bearing upon the
question. We have folllld none in this state directly touching it",8 cited to and focused
on established English precedents holding that "...upon the sale of a house in the
course of erection, there is an implied warranty that the house will be finished in a
workmanlike manner."9
Seven years later the Colorado Supreme Cowt would wrestle with the same

dearth oflegal precedents as the Ohio appellate court. There the Conrt also relied upon
established English precedent in adopting the implied warranty citing to the same

English cases explained in the Ohio decision.
However, the Colorado conrt
expanded the English decisions. While the Ohio court, like the English courts,
premised the implied warranty as ex:isting in a sale occurring before the house was
fully constructed. the Colorado conrt encompassed not only houses still under
construction but also newly finished houses. The court reasoned:

That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is
near completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems
incongruous. To say that the foimer may rely on an implied warranty and the
latter cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it. 11
This well-reasoned Colorado opinion provi<Ies the starting point for most jurisdictions'
subsequent adoption and modification of the implied warranty of habitability.

Consequently, a summary of the various court decisions reveals generally:
When a builder-vendor sells a home to an initial purchaser there is created an implied
warranty of habitability. However, in any specific circumstance it would be unwise to
exclusively rely upon this general rule because of its many and varied exceptions.
Following is a general discussion of seven factors which most C9urts consider in their
analyses of the applicability of the implied warranty.

ll.

Factors
Builder-vendor

Most jurisdictions have specifically limited liability to a builder vendor. 12 A
builder-vendor has been defined as "one who buys land and builds homes upon that
land for purposes of sale to the general public. "13 One court explained why the
builder-vendor should be the responsible party:
The applicability of the implied warranty is based upon the premise that,
with respect to the sale of new homes. the purchaser has little choice but to rely
upon the integrity and professional competence of the builder vendor. The
public interest dictates that if the construction of a new house is defective, its
repair cost should be borne by the responsible builder-vendor who created the
defect and is in a better economic position to bear the loss, rather than by the
ordinary purchaser who justifiably relied upon the builder's skill. 14

18

The definition of builder-vendor has been further refined by some courts to also
include that the builder-vendor be engaged in that profession. Consequently, the sale
15
is couunercial rather than casual or personal in nature. Titis limitation has been
placed to protect those vendors who have no greater skill relevant to determining the
quality of a house than the purchaser.16 As with the UCC "merchant", any person who
holds himself out as having particular skill and knowledge in his trade should be held
to a higher degree of responsibility.
Courts in a few jurisdictions have chosen to expand the number of persons
potentially liable for breach of the implied warranty. Some have held vendors, .who
were not also the builders, liable. 17 Vendors of the real estate were held liable
although an independent contractor had constructed the defective house. One court
explained its reasoning by noting that the vendor bad "placed the house in the stream
of commerce and had exacted a fair price for it Its liability -is not foWld upon fault,
but because it has profited by receiving a fair price and, as between it and an innocent
18
purchaser, the innocent purchaser should be protected from latent defects."
Another comt fmmd a builder who was not the vendor liable. The court could
see no difference between a builder or contractor who constructs a home and a
builder-developer. It doesn't matter whether the builder constructs the residence on
land he owns or land the purchaser owns. It is the structure and all its intricate
components and related facilities that are the subject matter of the implied warranty.
Mere builders must be as accountable for their worlananship as are builder
developers.19

19

that the extension is tmwise and unsubstantiated when considered with the purpose of
the warranty itsel£28 Relatively unknowledgeable buyers are those the warranty is
supposedly designed to protect. In contrast, purchasers of larger constructions should
have greater expertise or the funds to pmchase expert advice.

Since the imposition of the 1Ulqualified implied warranty is based upon the
theory that it is the ordinary home buyer, relatively ignorant of the business of buying
a home, who needs this statutory protection, the unqualified wammty is implied only
in purchases of one- or two-family homes. Anything larger than a two-family
dwelling is often an apartment house, and these are commonly pmchased by
corporations or individuals with enough wealth to afford competent inspection or
knowledge ofthe realty business?9

Initial Purchaser
With a few exceptions most state comts have limited recovery to initial
purchasers. A Missouri court explained that the contractual nature of the implied
warranty implicitly limits the right of action to the first purchase:30
Because the warranty is implied by virtue of the contemplated sale to
the first purchaser and arises by reason of the purchase, it theoretically accrues
in him. The practical aspects of the contractual defenses also lead to this
conclusion. The first purchaser is the only one with whom the builder may
negotiate an allocation of the ri.sk. Furthennore, the builder is in a better
position to know the condition
the home at the time of sale, and thus
whether defects were latent This is not true if the builder is sued by a
subsequent vendee? 1

of

Although the
of jurisdictions agree that the implied warranty attaches
to the sale of new housing/ some questions as to what is "new housing" have arisen.
Early in the development of the implied warranty, several states, relying on the English
precedents, distinguished between sales made while the homes were still under
construction and sales of completed homes?1 The earlier decisions limited recovery to
cases where the home was under construction at the time of sale, following what is
commonly referred to as the "Miller Rule."22 However, as reasoned by the Colorado
23
Supreme Court, most jurisdictions have reversed their earlier decisions, finding no
sound rationale for the distinction.

In California a court noted that this initial purchaser is the one who most needs
the warranty protection.32 The purchaser of a neyt building. unlike the buyer of an
older building has had "no opportunity to observe how the building has withstood the
passage of time. Thus he generally relies on those in a position to know the
of
the work to be sold, and his reliance is surely evident to the construction indust:Iy." 3

Some courts, however, have substituted the word "construction" for "housing"
when finding an implied warranty. 24 The result is warranty protection which extends
to apartment buildings,25 grain
and condominiwns.27 It has been argued

There are two general premises upon which most jurisdictions agree. First is
the fact that the warranty is an implied
one that is created by law and which
exists regardless of the intent of the parties. Because home purchasers rely on the

The Implied Warranty Itself
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knowledge and judgment of the.ir vendors, the warranty springs from the vendors' duty
not to take advantage of their superior positions.34 Second, negligence is not a relevant
issue. In one of the earlier cases holding that a new homeowner was entitled to
recover on an implied warranty of fitness for habitation, the cowt also held 1ha.t fault
or
on the part of the defendant was not required in order for the plaintiff to
recover. The fact that the defendant was the vendor of the real estate was sufficient
to make him liable. In a more recent decision another court agreed that "[o]n an
implied wammty, one may be held liable for damages even when he has exercised all
reasonable or even possible care.36
7

Some courts bave described the warranty as one of "fitness for habitation't3
while others have required "workmanlike construction. "38 The definition of "fit for
habitation" has caused some concern for the courts. The most extensive discussion of
habitability is found in the Dlinois case
v. Fox Valley Construction
Companv?9 The court set down what is considered to be the basic parameters of
habitability.40 They include:
(1)

It is possible for a new home to be in substantial compliance with
building codes and still be wrinhabitable.

(2)

The primary function of a new home is to shelter its inhabitants from
the elements. If a new home does not keep out the elements because of
a substantial defect of construction, such home is not habitable within
the meBning of the implied warranty of habitability.

(3)

Another function of a new home is to provide its inhabitants with a
reasonably safe place to live, without fear of injury to person, health,
safety, or property. If a new home is not structurally soood because of a
substantial defect of construction, such a home is not habitable within
the meaning of the implied warranty of habitability.

(4)

If a new home is not aesthetically satisfying because of a defect of
construction, such a defect shoUld not be considered as making the
home uninhabitable.

In another case the dispute also rested upon the determination of the type of
defect which renders a new home uninhabitable. The plaintiffs attempted to show that
41
their premises were rendered uninhabitable by noise from an air conditioning system.
Evidently the noise was undetectable during normal conversation sounds, but

disturbed them in the still of the night. The court rejected their azgwnents stressing the
fact that the test of breach of the warranty is an objective one; i.e., what reasonable
people would expect If "the premises met ordinary, normal standards reasonably to
be expected of living quarters of comparable kind and quality"42 they are deemed
habitable. There is no warranty to protect certain individuals who are hypersensitive.
The question "What is worlananlike construction?" bas not received the same
amount of attention as the issue of habitability. Evidently the courts have had little
difficulty in assessing it However, there is one noteworthy case in which a cowt
found a breach of the "implied warranty of proper construction and sound
workmanship. ,43 This case is mentioned because in it the court extended the meaning
of worlananship to include the concept of design. The builder had installed a septic
tank which failed to function properly. Apparently there was no defect in the material
or worlananship, but nevertheless the court found a breach of
because of a
"defect in the design from the time the septic tank was being installed

A court's choice of terminology (habitability or workmanlike construction)
could determine the buyer's ability to recover from his seller. A buyer who would win
a suit based on habitability could lose if the court recognized only the warranty of
workmanlike construction. As an illustration, consider a situation in which a builder
drilled a well in a workmanlike manner, but found no water fit for human
consumption.45 In this particular case the buyer recovered damages because the court
defined the warranty as fitness for habitation, but he would have lost had only
workmanlike construction been required. ·
On the other hand, consider the situation of the home buyer who receives an
improperly constructed fireplace. Obviously, he could recover damages under the
warranty of worlananlike construction, but in today's homes fire.places may be more
decorative than necessary. It might appear that buyers receive the most protection in
states where the cowts say that both warranties are implied.46 Then, however, the
buyers might have the burden of proving that
warranties were breached One
plaintifl: caught in the quandazy of words, lost his suit because he alleged only poor
workmanship and did not also allege that the home was not fit for human habitation. 47

Types of Defects
There has been a wide variance in the type of defect for which the courts have
allowed recove.ty. Generally, the courts have agreed that the defect must be a latent or
hidden defect which would not be apparent to the buyers upon reasonable inspection.

23

22
If the party asserting the implied warranty has a reasonable opportunity to discover the
48
defect and did not do so, the seller has a valid defense.

While some courts have allowed recovery for structural defects only, most have
included site or lot defects. A Pennsylvania court, reasoning that the purchaser of real
estate justifiably relies on his seller's expertise and superior opportunity to choose a
suitable site, became the first to hold a builder·vendor liable for latent site defects not
50
involving damage to a dwelling.49 This case along with many others t? follow,
involved a well which produced no water fit for human consumption. The
Pennsylvania court found that potable water supply is within the scope of the builder·
vendor's implied warranty because without it a house is rendered tminhabitable. This
rule stands true even when the quality of the water is not the result of poor drilling
techni'l!!es.s1 Other defects included defective
":ater
homes,53 cracked foundations and concrete worl<, defective arr condit:J.omng, ·
61
60
floors, 56 fireplaces, 57 electrical systems,S& roofs, 59 heating, insulation, and
plumbing.62
Duration of the Warranty
Obviously a pmchaser will not be able to discover the defects in his new home
mrtil he has oe<:upied the house for a reasonable length of time. The difficult decision
facing the coW'ts has been ''What constitutes a reasonable time?" As can be expected,
the comts have been reluctant to limit the warranty to a specific period. One of the
earlier decisions dealing with the duration of the builders liability was handed down
by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. In it the court stated:
....where there is a sale of a new house by a vendor who is also the
builder thereo:( there is an implied warranty of reasonable workmanship and
habitability sW'Viving the delivery of the deed. This is not to hold that the
builder is required to construct a perfect house. Whether the house is defective
is detennined by the test of reasonableness and not perfection, and the duration
of such liability after the taking of possession is to be determined by standards
of reasonableness.63
In this statement there are two ideas which courts have consistently agreed
upon. First. the duration of liability is to be detennined by standards 65
of
reasonableness64 and second, a builder is not required to construct a perfect house.
Yet, the "standard of reasonableness" test doesn't really tell a builder when his liability
will stop.

It has been suggested that the courts can extend the reach of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code to cover the building industry.66 Article 2, providing
implied warranty protection for items such as cars, appliances and other personal
property has a four year statute of limitations (which by agreement may be reduced to
no less than one year).67 When compared with a $1,000 appliance, a four-year
warranty limitation on an $80,000 new home hardly seems appropriate. Not only do
the personal property items cost significantly less, they also have a much shorter
economic life span. In spite of this difference, at least one state has limited the
wamwty on new housing to a one year period.68

Although it is unrealistic to expect a builder to insme against defects for the
total expected life of the house, it is also unrealistic to expect a new house buyer to be
satisfied with a one year warranty on such a large purchase. Considering variations in
weather conditions, a latent defect may take several years to become apparent. One
commentator has suggested that a ten year period of liability should be more than
sufficient.69 Several courts, recognizing that the various components which go into
the construction of a house have different life expectancies, refuse to set a specific
time limit for a warranty on an entire house. 70
Warranty Disclaimers
Some sophisticated builders who are aware of the doctrine of implied warranty
of habitability have included wammty disclaimers in their sales contracts. Of all the
issues involved in this type of litigation this is the most controversial and inconsistent
The comts
even agree if there ever could be an effective disclaimer, much less
what would be required to constitute it.
In Utah, a builder successfully disclaimed all implied warianties.by including
an "as is" provision in the real estate contract.71 The provision, which specified that
the purchasers "accepted the property in its present condition," was held to be
controlling and precluded the purchasers from asserting that the builder had impliedly
warranted that his homes were constructed in a good workmanlike manner.
In a contrasting opinion, a Rhode Island court stated that the plaintiff's agreeing
to taking the .gremises "in the same condition in which they now are" did not constitute

a disclaimer. 2 Although the wording of this attempted disclaimer was nearly the same
as in the Utah
the comt was reluctant to accept it as an effective disclaimer
because it didn't use language which specifically referred to its effect on warranties.
The court said "to effectuate the policies underlying the implied warranties of
habitability and reasonable workmanship, the court will construe exclusionary

25
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provisions of doubtful meaning strictly against those parties raising such provisions as
defenses. 73

As a result, the original tort form of the action, as well as the contract foon, still
survives today.

A Missouri court, in Crowder v. Vandendeale?4 presented a good discussion of
the requirements of an effective disclaimer. 75 First. it recognized the potential vitality
of traditional contract defense when employed under the proper circumstances.
According to the court, the parties have a right to make their own bargain as to
economic risk; but since a disclaimer varies implied warranty tenns, there exists a
heavy bmden of proof to demonstrate that in fact the bargain was actually made.

This duality is significant today because, depending upon a particular court's
choice of contract or tort, several aspects of a case such as the survival of actions, the
measme of damages, the statute of limitations and the requirement of privity of
contract will likely vary. Prosser concluded, "...the concept of warranty has involved
so many major difficulties and disadvantages that it is very questionable whether it has
not become rather a burden than a boon to the courts in what they are ttying to
accomplish. ..82

Second, the court stated that one seeking the benefit of a disclaimer must prove
that there was a conspicuous provision which fully disclosed its consequences. Third,

the disclaimer must have in fact been voluntarily agreed upon. The builder must bear
the weight of this burden of proof because by asserting the disclaimer he is trying to
show that the buyer gave up protection given to him by public policy. Courts will not
imply that this protection was waived just because boilerplate clauses are included in a
contract
Courts have not been able to agree if an express warranty given by a builder
automatically negates the implied warranties. The court in Richman v. Watel found it
did not 76 The comt said that because the breach of an implied warranty in housing is
considered to be a tort rather than a contract concept (a developing concept which will
be discussed below), the
written one year warranty did not limit or exclude the
implied warranty of :fitness.
1n Colorado, a court agreed that if the express warranty contained no words of
limitation, then the builder had not abrogated or limited his common law implied
warranties.7g However, in Arkansas, it was held that implied warranties are not
applicable when 1here is an express warranty.79 The court stated that it reached this
conclusion by analogy to pre-Commelcial Code sales contract cases where it was held
that if an express warranty was present it was exclusive.80

ill.

The truth of his conclusion is revealed when one examines the warranty of
habitability comt decisions. As indicated earlier, in the decisions in which privity was
the controlling issue, most courts viewed the warranty as sounding in contracts;
therefore privity is required. 83 Moreover, in many instances the comts have also listed
practical reasons for the privity requirements:
(1)

The first purchaser is the only one with whom the builder may negotiate an
allocation of the risk.84 If the builder had lowered the purchase price because
of defects in the structure he would have double liability if a subsequent
purchaser were also pemritted to recover.

(2)

A builder is in a better position to know the condition of a home at the time of
85
'·
sale rather than at a later date.

(3)

Real estate transactions require a written contract or deed. Each subsequent
purchaser may require from his vendor any warranties he wishes. to have on
improvements.86

(4)

There are significant differences between manufactured products and homes
that analogies are not appropriate. 87

(5)

There are several other means of protection for the home buyer which will
enable him to enter the housing market on an equal footing with the builder.88
Examples are: "astute consumer appraisal of potential builders, inspections
where possible, support of HOW builders, and government warranties where
either VA or FHA :financing is utilized. "89

The Privity Issue and Subsequent Purchasers

Prosser described a warranty as a "...freak hybrid born of the illicit inten:omse
of tort and contract."81 The action for breach of warranty was originally a tort action,
closely resembling the tort of deceit. In the late eighteenth century, courts, for
procedural convenience, detennined that a contract action could also be maintained

26
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In contrast, several courts have now disregarded privity arguments and
extended warranty protection to subsequent purchasers.90 In 1976 an Indiana court,
with little commentary, held that a builders implied warranty of fitness for habitation
runs not only in favor of the first owner, but extends also to subsequent purchasers. 91
However, this implied warranty is limited to latent defects which are not discoverable
by 1he subsequent pmchasers by reasonable inspection and which become manifest
only after the purchase.

The Wyoming Supreme Court, acknowledging that the Indiana court had
furnished a "reasonably worlcable rule,"92 added its own reason for extending the
warranty:

The purpose of a warranty is to protect innocent purchasers and bold
builders accountable for their work. With that object in mind, any reasoning
which would arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an obstruction to someone
equally as deserving of recovery is incomprehensible. Let us asswne for
example a person contracts construction of a home and, a month after
occupying, is transferred to another locality and must sell. Or let us look at the
family which contracts construction, occupies the home and the head of the
household dies a year later and the residence must, for economic reasons, be
sold. Further, how about the one who contracts for construction of a home,
occupies it and, after a couple of years, attracted by a profit incentive caused
by inflation or otherwise, sells to another. No reason has been presented to us
whereby the original owner should have the benefits of an implied warranty or
a recovery on a negligence theory and the next owner should not simply
because there has been a transfer. Such intervening sales, standing by
themselves, should not, by any standard of reasonableness, effect an end to an
implied warranty or, in that matter, a right of recovery on any other ground,
upon manifestation of a defect. The builder always has available the defense
that the defects are not attributable to him.93
Also relying upon the Indiana decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
abolished the privity requirement for liability.94 The rule it
was essentialiy
identical to those in Indiana and Wyoming. Three justifications for its decision were
set forth:
( 1)

Because latent construction defects can swface several years after the initial
sale, there is no sound basis for the reasoning that only first oWners need
warranty protection.

(2)
(3)

Prospective purchasers rely on the builder's expertise.
Because of their limited knowledge purchasers cannot discover latent

construction defects. 95

Mississippi has also experienced a transformation in overruling wellestablished precedents in abolishing the privity requirement. In a lengthy, wellreasoned decision. the Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled
The current trend in other jurisdictions extends protection to remote
purchasers who have no contractual relationship or privity with the buildervendor. For example, where a remote purchaser can prove negligence on the
part of the builder vendor which results in foreseeable injury or loss to the
remote purchaser, a remote purchaser has been entitled to recovery for
damages. (citations omitted) And, the privity barrier has also been removed in
recent cases based on the implied warranty theory. (citations omitted) In light
of this new substantial trend of authority, we think it worthwhile to reexamine
our past rulings on this issue.96

In reexamining its position, the Mississippi Court opined that there is no reasonable
justification not to extend the same protection to a subsequent purchaser as to the
initial purchaser; consequently, the. Court abolished the privity requirement 97
Although privity was not the central issue,
Texas Court of Civil Appeals
decisi<m.., 98 dicta indicated ·that privity requirements also have been eliminated. The
court made it clear that the sale of a house carries with it an implied warranty of
habitability, and that a breach of such warranty gives rise to a cause of action in tort
rather than contract Since privity of contract is not relevant in a tort action, warranties
should extend to subsequent purchasers. Along this same line, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas has fmmd that a house is a "product" for purposes of the Arkansas strict
liability statute and the District of Colwnbia District Court has not precluded
condominiums from falling under the same analysis. 99 Therefore the implied warranty
of habitability was extended to subsequent purchasers for a reasonable length of time.
The Arkansas court, quoting another case in justifying its decision, succinctly stated,
In this era of complex marketing practices and assembly line
manufacturing conditions, restrictive notions of privity of contract
between manufacturer and conswner must be put aside and the realistic
view of strict liability adopted 100

29
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IV.

Products Liability Compared

Several courts which have extended the wammty protection to subsequent
purchasers indicated that they did so because they could see no significant reason to
differentiate between strict liability for manufactured products and real estate
improvements. This section of the paper will first review the .
for
creating strict liability and then discuss whether the same reasorung IS applicable to
improved real estate.

Prosser listed three reasons why courts have accepted strict liability for
products.
(1)

(2)

(3)

The public interest in human life, health and safety demands the maximmn
possible protection that the law can give against dangerous defects in products
which consumers must buy, and against which they are helpless to protect
themselves; and it justifies the imposition, upon all suppliers of such products,
of full responsibility for the harm they cause, even though the supplier has not
been negligent
The supplier, by placing the goods upon the market, repre.sent to the public that
they are suitable and safe for use; and by packaging, advertising or otherwise,
he does everything he can to induce that belief. He intends and expects that the
product will be purchased and used in reliance upon tbis assurance of safety, ·
and it is in fact so purchased and used. The supplier has invited and solicited
the use; and when it leads to disaster, he should not be pennitted to·avoid the
responsibility by saying that he has made no contract with the consumer.
It is already possible to enforce strict liability by resort to a series of actions, in
which the retailer is first held liable on a warranty to his purchaser, and
indemnity on a warranty is then sought successively from other suppliers, until
the manufactmer finally pays the damages, with the added cost of repeated
litigation. This is an expensive, time consuming and wasteful process, and it
may be interrupted by insolvency, lack ofjmisdiction, disclaimer, or the statute
of limitations, anywhere along the line. What is needed is a blanket rule which
makes any supplier in the chain dll'ectly liable to the ultimate user and so shortcircuits the whole unwieldy procedure. 101

A comparison of these reasons (for establishing strict liability for defective
products) and the reasons the courts have stated for creating implied warranties of
habitability reveals no substantial differences. As with products, there is certainly a
public interest in protecting consumers from defects in housing. Consumers are
certainly no less helpless when buying a house than when buying a product.
California vezy early recognized the application of strict liability concepts
within the pruview of the implied warranty of habitability. Applying dicta from the
landmazk California strict liability case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,102
the California court reasoned that if injmy results from defective worlananship, then
strict liability may apply even though the "product" is a home. 103
The builder, much like the supplier, places his housing upon the market and
represents that it is suitable and safe for use. Why should he be permitted to avoid
responsibility just because he had no contact with a subsequent pW'Chaser? Also, as
wilh product liability, what is the sense in requiring a subsequent purchaser to sue his
vendor, and on up the line, if the defect is ultimately the responsibility of the builder?
As Prosser stated, it is "an expensive, time conswning and wasteful process... "104
There are a few weak arguments set forth attempting to show why strict
liability is appropriate for products, but not housing. One argmnent is that products
are mass marketed. housing is not 105 Through mass-marketing it is argued that
suppliers attempt to insulate themselves behind a wall of intermediaries. In contrast,
builders contract directly wi1h the original purchaser. The argument concludes with
the statement that a builder-vendor may not have been reasonably expected to
anticipate a change in ownership.
·
·This argument is simply untenable. Reasonable builders would anticipate
change in ownership. Anyway, what difference does it make? Ifthe home has a latent
defect which eventually manifests itself: why should it matter who the builder
expected to own it? It is 1he latent defect which gives rise to the liability, not the
status of the owner. Moreover what difference should it make if a builder attempts to
insulate himself from liability by a wall of intennediaries or first purchasers? Again,
the liability arises from the builder's defect/negligence. not the status of the owner.
Other attempted distinctions have no more strength than the argmnent above.
For example, one court emphasized that material and workmanship which may go into
a home are of infinite variety. 106 An original purchaser may have negotiated for lesser
quality. That is true; but isn't 1his also true of products? Some products sell for lower
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because of inferior materials or workmanship. But, manufacturers are still

poten1tially liable for latent defects.

ENDNOTES

By way of illustration: would a consumer reasonably expect his new mower to
explode just because it was the less expensive model? Obviously not. Would a
subsequent purchaser of a home expect his walls to cave in because his home was the
less expensive model? Again, obviously not.

LJ. 1099 (1960).

v.

3.Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liabili1y to the Consuiner) 50 MINN. L. R
791 (1966).

Conclusion

Courts have recognized that the purchase of a home is usually the largest single
purchase of a lifetime. Purchasers are generally helples.s in the transaction because
they lack the training and experience to recognize the possible latent defects. To
remedy the situation. in the past twenty years forty-one jurisdictions have court·
created warranties of habitability. Generally, the warranties state that when a builder·
vendor sells a home to an initial purchaser there exists an implied wammty of
habitability. Because it is court created, the rule varies quite extensively from
jmisdiction to jurisdiction. Consequently, many courts have placed artificial
limitations upon the warranty.
One such limitation is the requirement that a plaintiff must be an initial
purchaser in order to recover. However, this limitation has come under rigorous
scrutiny; states such as Mississippi, South Carolina, and Wyoming have reviewed this
limitation and have found it wanting. As the Mississippi Supreme Court noted, it
seems that the trend has shifted. When scrutinized under a reasonableness test, there
can be no justification to preclude a subsequent purchaser from a cause of
the
privity requirement serves no pmpose. There appears to be no sound reasoning for the
limitation other than the fact that many courts see the warranty as one based on
contract.I07

Yet. some courts, like the District of Columbia, have moved the area of implied
warranty of habitability out of contract law and into the tort area; thus, rules governing
tort actions, including strict liability, 108 become applicable. Consequently, a
comparison of the development of strict products liability and the development of the
warranty of habitability reveals that the policy considerations for both are vecy similar.
If the similarity in development continues, courts may follow the D.C. example and
soon discard the privity requirements, thus allowing recovery to subsequent
purchasers.
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FOR LOVE OR MONEY: NONPROF1T SURVIVAL
IN A FOR PROfiT WORLD
by
Nancy 1 Lasher·
Ronald C. Goldfarb••
Once upon a time, the process of budgeting for most nonprofit
organizations was very simple. My favorite illustration is the
story of how one Ivy League university set its budget in the
years right after World War ll. The university was run by one
vice-president and two deans... The vice·president and senior
deans would meet with the president early in the summer at hls
summer home... Somewhere between the first and second
martini, the president and his two chief administrators would
settle the budget for the year and decide on the amount of any
tuition increase needed to keep the university happily in the
black.
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106.0/iver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. !"974); (see fu. %infra;
while this case has been overruled, it is used here for illustrative purposes only).

Times, of course, have change4.
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107.For a detailed listing of jurisdictions recognizing negligence as a remedy, see
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Variously known as charitable, eleemosynary or nonprofit associations,
small conununity based organizations whose mission it is "to help the less
fortunate" are deeply imbedded in the American psyche. Such organizations
sprang up fast and furiously as the Industrial Revolution sped forward in this

108.See, California: Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., supra; District of Columbia:
Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., supra; New Jersey: Hermi!s v. Staiano, supra; Arkansas:
Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., supra.

• Assistant Professor of Accountancy/I:,aw, Trenton State College
" Assistant Professor, Dept. of Accounting and Legal Studies, Middlesex County College

